Paper Type

Short

Paper Number

1556

Description

Many e-commerce platforms adopt various government policies, such as quality certification and buyer protection programs, to mitigate information asymmetry. While the benefits of these strategies in reducing information asymmetry and improving matching performance are well recognized, there is much less understanding in the literature on the platform-endorsed service guarantee that offers comprehensive commitments that span the entire consumer purchase journey, and how it affects sellers’ performance, including their guaranteed and non-guaranteed product sales. Using a quasi-experimental opportunity of Tmall Guarantee, we find that the platform-endorsed service guarantee has a positive effect on the guaranteed product sales (i.e., signaling effect). However, it reduces the sellers’ non-guaranteed products (i.e., cannibalization effect). Furthermore, we distinguish the two mechanisms that potentially drive these effects: consumer purchase intention and seller service effort. Our results hold across multiple robustness checks and provide important insights for platform government strategy and operational management in e-commerce.

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E-Business

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Jul 2nd, 12:00 AM

Impacts of Platform-Endorsed Service Guarantee on Seller Performance: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Many e-commerce platforms adopt various government policies, such as quality certification and buyer protection programs, to mitigate information asymmetry. While the benefits of these strategies in reducing information asymmetry and improving matching performance are well recognized, there is much less understanding in the literature on the platform-endorsed service guarantee that offers comprehensive commitments that span the entire consumer purchase journey, and how it affects sellers’ performance, including their guaranteed and non-guaranteed product sales. Using a quasi-experimental opportunity of Tmall Guarantee, we find that the platform-endorsed service guarantee has a positive effect on the guaranteed product sales (i.e., signaling effect). However, it reduces the sellers’ non-guaranteed products (i.e., cannibalization effect). Furthermore, we distinguish the two mechanisms that potentially drive these effects: consumer purchase intention and seller service effort. Our results hold across multiple robustness checks and provide important insights for platform government strategy and operational management in e-commerce.

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