Abstract

AI-generated review summaries (AIGS) are increasingly adopted by e-commerce platforms to reduce information overload and improve review efficiency. However, existing research mainly examines consumer responses to AIGS and pays limited attention to its strategic implications for firms. This study develops a game-theoretic model of a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells through an offline direct channel and an online platform under either the wholesale mode or the agency mode. We compare equilibrium outcomes with and without AIGS adoption, where AIGS improves review informativeness but requires platform investment. The results show that the agency mode always induces a higher online retail price than the wholesale mode, while the offline price ranking depends on review precision and AI enhancement. In addition, AIGS always strengthens the manufacturer’s preference for the agency mode, whereas the platform prefers the agency mode only when AI investment cost is sufficiently low. Thus, AIGS not only improves information efficiency, but also reshapes governance preferences in dual-channel supply chains. Our study extends the literature by endogenizing AI-based information design in selling-mode choice.

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