Abstract

Government platforms, such as government credit platforms, handle highly sensitive personal data, requiring stringent security authentication (e.g., facial recognition, multi-factor verification) that protects users but impedes their experience. Drawing on Tomalin’s (2023) e-friction typology and the emerging literature on beneficial design friction, we reconceptualize these authentication measures as protective friction, a theoretically distinct form of non-elective, overt, impeding e-friction that serves a security-enhancing function. We propose a dual-pathway model in which protective friction simultaneously reduces privacy-security risk perception (protection pathway) and increases effort cost (cost pathway), with self-efficacy moderating only the risk pathway. This differential pattern suggests that what matters is not users’ ability to overcome friction, but their comprehension of its protective purpose, a construct we term protective mechanism comprehension. We outline a mixed-methods research design combining a survey of platform users and semi-structured interviews with platform staff at a Chinese municipal credit center to test this model. This research-in-progress contributes to IS theory by extending e-friction research from conceptual typology to empirical investigation, identifying when security friction becomes beneficial rather than burdensome.

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