Paper Type
Complete
Paper Number
PACIS2026-1492
Description
Platform governance research has focused predominantly on the design of sanctions imposed for misconduct, leaving the structure through which sanctioned users return to the platform largely unexplored. This study examines how transitioning from participation-contingent to performance-contingent reinstatement reshapes user behavior in coordination-intensive digital platforms. Drawing on agency theory under imperfect observability, we interpret platform misconduct as a problem of cost externalization where users facing perceived loss externalize costs onto other users through two empirically distinct forms of avoidance: withdrawal and destructive engagement. A region-specific policy change on a major multiplayer online game platform provides a natural experiment, and a propensity-score-matched difference-in-differences design identifies the causal effects of reinstatement redesign. Performance-contingent reinstatement reduces user misconducts and generates positive spillover to newly introduced service. The findings establish reinstatement design as a structurally selective intervention through which platforms can substitute outcome-contingent governance rules and discipline the externality structure that gives rise to misconduct.
Recommended Citation
Kang, Hyeonwoo; Kim, Jeongha; Lee, Dongwon; and Um, Sungyong, "Turning Punishment into Performance: A Natural Experiment on “Win-to-Unlock” Governance" (2026). PACIS 2026 Proceedings. 7.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2026/data_analtyics/data_anltics/7
Turning Punishment into Performance: A Natural Experiment on “Win-to-Unlock” Governance
Platform governance research has focused predominantly on the design of sanctions imposed for misconduct, leaving the structure through which sanctioned users return to the platform largely unexplored. This study examines how transitioning from participation-contingent to performance-contingent reinstatement reshapes user behavior in coordination-intensive digital platforms. Drawing on agency theory under imperfect observability, we interpret platform misconduct as a problem of cost externalization where users facing perceived loss externalize costs onto other users through two empirically distinct forms of avoidance: withdrawal and destructive engagement. A region-specific policy change on a major multiplayer online game platform provides a natural experiment, and a propensity-score-matched difference-in-differences design identifies the causal effects of reinstatement redesign. Performance-contingent reinstatement reduces user misconducts and generates positive spillover to newly introduced service. The findings establish reinstatement design as a structurally selective intervention through which platforms can substitute outcome-contingent governance rules and discipline the externality structure that gives rise to misconduct.
Comments
05-DataAnalytics