Paper Type
Short
Paper Number
1142
Description
Gatekeeping is a pivotal governance mechanism employed by digital platforms to regulate complementors’ access to platform resources and preserve the quality of their contributions. But in so doing, gatekeeping simultaneously constrains the quantity of complementors, which could be detrimental for the sustained growth of digital platforms. Despite growing scholarly attention, the effects of gatekeeping on non-monetized platforms which relies primarily on complementors’ voluntary contributions, remains underexplored. Unlike paid complementors, unpaid complementors are motivated by factors beyond monetary gains and may react differently to gatekeeping measures. Analyzing a temporary lapse of gatekeeping activities caused by moderators strike on Stack Overflow, we elucidate how gatekeeping affects the behavior of unpaid complementors. Employing quasi difference-in-difference (DID), we reveal that previously inactive complementors increased their contributions while previously active complementors were demotivated after the lapse of gatekeeping. Our findings enrich extant literature on platform governance by illuminating the impact of gatekeeping on unpaid complementors.
Recommended Citation
Pu, Xiaodie; Sindihebura, Tanguy Tresor; ZHENG, Shiying; and Tan, Chee-Wee, "Curating the Commons: The Effects of Platform Gatekeeping on Unpaid Complementors" (2024). PACIS 2024 Proceedings. 8.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2024/track06_dpe/track06_dpe/8
Curating the Commons: The Effects of Platform Gatekeeping on Unpaid Complementors
Gatekeeping is a pivotal governance mechanism employed by digital platforms to regulate complementors’ access to platform resources and preserve the quality of their contributions. But in so doing, gatekeeping simultaneously constrains the quantity of complementors, which could be detrimental for the sustained growth of digital platforms. Despite growing scholarly attention, the effects of gatekeeping on non-monetized platforms which relies primarily on complementors’ voluntary contributions, remains underexplored. Unlike paid complementors, unpaid complementors are motivated by factors beyond monetary gains and may react differently to gatekeeping measures. Analyzing a temporary lapse of gatekeeping activities caused by moderators strike on Stack Overflow, we elucidate how gatekeeping affects the behavior of unpaid complementors. Employing quasi difference-in-difference (DID), we reveal that previously inactive complementors increased their contributions while previously active complementors were demotivated after the lapse of gatekeeping. Our findings enrich extant literature on platform governance by illuminating the impact of gatekeeping on unpaid complementors.
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