Start Date
12-16-2013
Description
Online privacy remains an ongoing source of debate in society. Sensitive to this, many web platforms are offering users greater, more granular control over how and when their information is revealed. However, recent research suggests that information control mechanisms of this sort are not necessarily of economic benefit to the parties involved. We examine these mechanisms and their economic consequences, leveraging data from one of the world's largest global crowdfunding platforms, where contributors can conceal their identity or contribution amounts from public display. We find that information hiding is more likely when contributors are under greater scrutiny or exhibiting “undesirable” behavior. We also identify an anchoring effect from prior contributions, which is eliminated when earlier contributors conceal their amounts. Subsequent analyses indicate that a nuanced approach to the design and provision of information control mechanisms, such as varying default settings based on contribution amounts, can help promote larger contributions.
Recommended Citation
Burtch, Gordon; Ghose, Anindya; and Wattal, Sunil, "An Empirical Examination of Users’ Information Hiding in a Crowdfunding Context" (2013). ICIS 2013 Proceedings. 6.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2013/proceedings/EconomicsOfIS/6
An Empirical Examination of Users’ Information Hiding in a Crowdfunding Context
Online privacy remains an ongoing source of debate in society. Sensitive to this, many web platforms are offering users greater, more granular control over how and when their information is revealed. However, recent research suggests that information control mechanisms of this sort are not necessarily of economic benefit to the parties involved. We examine these mechanisms and their economic consequences, leveraging data from one of the world's largest global crowdfunding platforms, where contributors can conceal their identity or contribution amounts from public display. We find that information hiding is more likely when contributors are under greater scrutiny or exhibiting “undesirable” behavior. We also identify an anchoring effect from prior contributions, which is eliminated when earlier contributors conceal their amounts. Subsequent analyses indicate that a nuanced approach to the design and provision of information control mechanisms, such as varying default settings based on contribution amounts, can help promote larger contributions.