Paper Type

Complete

Abstract

Data spaces promise sovereign inter-organizational data sharing, yet use cases rarely progress beyond pilots. We argue governance—not technology—is the primary bottleneck. Drawing on deductive theory elaboration, we conceptualize collaborative data space use cases as Use Case Ventures: joint venture-like initiatives requiring partner commitment, control-right allocation, and value distribution without hierarchical authority. Three data-distinctive properties—non-rivalry, inferential risk, and derivative persistence—systematically modify standard alliance governance predictions. Integrating transaction cost economics, the relational view, and property rights theory, we develop a governance framework specifying three interdependent mechanisms: contractual safeguards including technical enforcement, control-right allocation as bundled data rights, and relational governance spanning coopetitive boundaries. Eight testable propositions link governance design to use-case viability, moderated by asset specificity, ecosystem maturity, partner complementarity, and coopetition intensity. The paper advances IS research on inter-organizational systems by theorizing the use-case governance layer of multi-party data collaboration with data-specific extensions to alliance governance logic.

Paper Number

1795

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Aug 15th, 12:00 AM

Developing Collaborative Use Cases in Data Spaces: A Joint-Venture Perspective on Multi-Party Data Collaboration Governance

Data spaces promise sovereign inter-organizational data sharing, yet use cases rarely progress beyond pilots. We argue governance—not technology—is the primary bottleneck. Drawing on deductive theory elaboration, we conceptualize collaborative data space use cases as Use Case Ventures: joint venture-like initiatives requiring partner commitment, control-right allocation, and value distribution without hierarchical authority. Three data-distinctive properties—non-rivalry, inferential risk, and derivative persistence—systematically modify standard alliance governance predictions. Integrating transaction cost economics, the relational view, and property rights theory, we develop a governance framework specifying three interdependent mechanisms: contractual safeguards including technical enforcement, control-right allocation as bundled data rights, and relational governance spanning coopetitive boundaries. Eight testable propositions link governance design to use-case viability, moderated by asset specificity, ecosystem maturity, partner complementarity, and coopetition intensity. The paper advances IS research on inter-organizational systems by theorizing the use-case governance layer of multi-party data collaboration with data-specific extensions to alliance governance logic.