Paper ID
1288
Paper Type
full
Description
Today, service delivery heavily relies on complex information and optimization systems aimed at maximizing provider efficiency; i.e. implementing provider-oriented service delivery (POSD). POSD, however, completely neglects potential for optimization on the customer side. By addressing this issue, system-oriented service delivery (SOSD) is a Pareto improvement over POSD. SOSD, however, also allows strategic (i.e. untruthful) behavior of system participants. In this work, we analytically analyze whether participants have an incentive to behave strategically and how such behavior impacts other participants in SOSD. This work shows that SOSD may suffer from strategic behavior, since neither truthful- nor untruthfulness is an individually dominant strategy. Furthermore, even though a truthfully behaving participant in SOSD may suffer from another participant’s untruthfulness, his total costs are still lower than in POSD for practically relevant situations. Hence, SOSD allows to behave either truthfully with certain cost reduction or to behave strategically with uncertain outcome.
Recommended Citation
Wolff, Clemens and Kimbrough, Steven, "Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in System-Oriented Service Delivery" (2019). ICIS 2019 Proceedings. 1.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2019/smart_service_science/smart_service_science/1
Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in System-Oriented Service Delivery
Today, service delivery heavily relies on complex information and optimization systems aimed at maximizing provider efficiency; i.e. implementing provider-oriented service delivery (POSD). POSD, however, completely neglects potential for optimization on the customer side. By addressing this issue, system-oriented service delivery (SOSD) is a Pareto improvement over POSD. SOSD, however, also allows strategic (i.e. untruthful) behavior of system participants. In this work, we analytically analyze whether participants have an incentive to behave strategically and how such behavior impacts other participants in SOSD. This work shows that SOSD may suffer from strategic behavior, since neither truthful- nor untruthfulness is an individually dominant strategy. Furthermore, even though a truthfully behaving participant in SOSD may suffer from another participant’s untruthfulness, his total costs are still lower than in POSD for practically relevant situations. Hence, SOSD allows to behave either truthfully with certain cost reduction or to behave strategically with uncertain outcome.