Start Date
10-12-2017 12:00 AM
Description
Our study examines the curvilinear relationship between one’s advice network centrality and various work outcomes in tech firms, and investigates the extent to which individuals’ political skills can reduce the downside risks of large informational networks. We conducted a comprehensive study by collecting information from multiple sources – interviews, individual surveys and individual performance data – from two Chinese firms. Our results reveal that individuals’ advice network centrality is curvilinearly associated with their work performance. We also examine the extent to which one poses a hindrance to others. The results reveal a curvilinear relationship between one’s advice network centrality and hindrance network centrality, indicating exponentially increasing marginal effects on hindering others when one’s advice network centrality becomes higher. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that political skills assist individuals in managing large advice networks and avoid hindering others.
Recommended Citation
Chen, Yi; Boh, Wai Fong; Wong, Sze Sze; and Shao, Jun, "Too Much of a Good Thing: Downsides of a Large Network in Tech Firms and Mitigating Effects of Political Skills" (2017). ICIS 2017 Proceedings. 8.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2017/HumanBehavior/Presentations/8
Too Much of a Good Thing: Downsides of a Large Network in Tech Firms and Mitigating Effects of Political Skills
Our study examines the curvilinear relationship between one’s advice network centrality and various work outcomes in tech firms, and investigates the extent to which individuals’ political skills can reduce the downside risks of large informational networks. We conducted a comprehensive study by collecting information from multiple sources – interviews, individual surveys and individual performance data – from two Chinese firms. Our results reveal that individuals’ advice network centrality is curvilinearly associated with their work performance. We also examine the extent to which one poses a hindrance to others. The results reveal a curvilinear relationship between one’s advice network centrality and hindrance network centrality, indicating exponentially increasing marginal effects on hindering others when one’s advice network centrality becomes higher. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that political skills assist individuals in managing large advice networks and avoid hindering others.