Location
260-092, Owen G. Glenn Building
Start Date
12-15-2014
Description
Using crowd-based contests to acquire creative designs is increasingly popular. In this study, I examine how client-provided information in design contests affect participants’ strategy and contest submissions. In these contests, clients often provide examples of designs that they like, thereby signaling their design preference. Using prospect theory, I relate participants’ contest payoffs and cost considerations to the extent that they deviate their submissions from client-provided examples. Results from a banner ad design contest show that participants (i) deviate their designs more from clients’ examples when the examples’ quality is lower, and when the examples are relatively similar, and (ii) submit designs that are more distinctive in contests when they deviate from clients’ examples. These results indicate that participants do not always seek to win contests by aligning their submissions to clients’ preference. Instead, participants’ strategy also depends on other benefits of contest participation and their preference to minimize participation costs.
Recommended Citation
Koh, Tat Koon, "Participants’ Strategy in Crowd-Based Design Contests – A Prospect Theory Perspective" (2014). ICIS 2014 Proceedings. 37.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2014/proceedings/HumanBehavior/37
Participants’ Strategy in Crowd-Based Design Contests – A Prospect Theory Perspective
260-092, Owen G. Glenn Building
Using crowd-based contests to acquire creative designs is increasingly popular. In this study, I examine how client-provided information in design contests affect participants’ strategy and contest submissions. In these contests, clients often provide examples of designs that they like, thereby signaling their design preference. Using prospect theory, I relate participants’ contest payoffs and cost considerations to the extent that they deviate their submissions from client-provided examples. Results from a banner ad design contest show that participants (i) deviate their designs more from clients’ examples when the examples’ quality is lower, and when the examples are relatively similar, and (ii) submit designs that are more distinctive in contests when they deviate from clients’ examples. These results indicate that participants do not always seek to win contests by aligning their submissions to clients’ preference. Instead, participants’ strategy also depends on other benefits of contest participation and their preference to minimize participation costs.