Location
Level 0, Open Space, Owen G. Glenn Building
Start Date
12-15-2014
Description
Recent conflicts between big content and service providers (CSPs) like Netflix, transit providers (TPs), and Internet service providers (ISPs) have generated considerate media attention and ignited a debate on interconnection agreements, market power of last-mile ISPs and net neutrality. We propose an experimental design to analyze a stylized interconnection market that captures key aspects of actual interconnection markets with a focus on the entry of big CSPs. Participants are invited to assume the roles of ISPs, TPs and CSPs in a computer-aided laboratory experiment. The experiment serves to evaluate potential regulatory tools like transparency and interconnection obligation with respect to the efficiency of the overall interconnection market. Furthermore, we present results of a pre-test of the experimental design and the software implementation. Our preliminary results indicate that operators underinvest into network infrastructure and do not realize the full potential of mutual peering agreements when a CSP participates in the market.
Recommended Citation
Wiewiorra, Lukas and Schweitzer, Sascha, "Paid Peering and Content Delivery" (2014). ICIS 2014 Proceedings. 16.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2014/proceedings/EconomicsandValue/16
Paid Peering and Content Delivery
Level 0, Open Space, Owen G. Glenn Building
Recent conflicts between big content and service providers (CSPs) like Netflix, transit providers (TPs), and Internet service providers (ISPs) have generated considerate media attention and ignited a debate on interconnection agreements, market power of last-mile ISPs and net neutrality. We propose an experimental design to analyze a stylized interconnection market that captures key aspects of actual interconnection markets with a focus on the entry of big CSPs. Participants are invited to assume the roles of ISPs, TPs and CSPs in a computer-aided laboratory experiment. The experiment serves to evaluate potential regulatory tools like transparency and interconnection obligation with respect to the efficiency of the overall interconnection market. Furthermore, we present results of a pre-test of the experimental design and the software implementation. Our preliminary results indicate that operators underinvest into network infrastructure and do not realize the full potential of mutual peering agreements when a CSP participates in the market.