Location
Online
Event Website
https://hicss.hawaii.edu/
Start Date
3-1-2023 12:00 AM
End Date
7-1-2023 12:00 AM
Description
The integration of converter-interfaced generation into our power systems is changing how we control and operate these networks. While these fast-acting resources are more controllable than conventional synchronous machines, this additional controllability presents some challenges. One of these challenges is the increased cyber-physical attack surface arising from interactions among the numerous digital control loops of these devices. In this work, we present a supervisory adaptive controller that temporarily increases the outer-loop controller bandwidth of these devices in the event of sustained oscillatory behavior. We design this controller to inherently remain inactive during normal operation and only become active during sustained abnormal operating conditions. We show how this proposed controller can mitigate a cyber-physical attack, even when the attacker has full knowledge of the network model and access to real-time state information for state-feedback control.
Recommended Citation
Roberts, Ciaran; Callaway, Duncan; and Arnold, Daniel, "Outer-loop Adaptive Control of Converter-Interfaced Generation for Cyber-Physical Security" (2023). Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2023 (HICSS-56). 7.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/hicss-56/es/monitoring/7
Outer-loop Adaptive Control of Converter-Interfaced Generation for Cyber-Physical Security
Online
The integration of converter-interfaced generation into our power systems is changing how we control and operate these networks. While these fast-acting resources are more controllable than conventional synchronous machines, this additional controllability presents some challenges. One of these challenges is the increased cyber-physical attack surface arising from interactions among the numerous digital control loops of these devices. In this work, we present a supervisory adaptive controller that temporarily increases the outer-loop controller bandwidth of these devices in the event of sustained oscillatory behavior. We design this controller to inherently remain inactive during normal operation and only become active during sustained abnormal operating conditions. We show how this proposed controller can mitigate a cyber-physical attack, even when the attacker has full knowledge of the network model and access to real-time state information for state-feedback control.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/hicss-56/es/monitoring/7