Measuring Confidence of Assurance Cases in Safety-Critical Domains

Measuring Confidence of Assurance Cases in Safety-Critical Domains

Grand Wailea, Hawaii

Evaluation of assurance cases typically requires certifiers’ domain knowledge and experience, and, as such, most software certification has been conducted manually. Given the advancement in uncertainty theories and software traceability, we envision that these technologies can synergistically be combined and leveraged to offer some degree of automation to improve the certifiers’ capability to perform software certification. To this end, we present DS4AC, a novel confidence calculation framework that 1) applies the Dempster-Shafer theory to calculate the confidence between a parent claim and its children claims; and 2) uses the vector space model to evaluate the confidence for the evidence items using traceability information. We illustrate our approach on two different applications, where safety is the key property of interest for both systems. In both cases, we use the Goal Structuring Notation to represent the respective assurance cases and provide proof of concept results that demonstrate the DS4AC framework can automate portions of the evaluation of assurance cases, thereby reducing the burden of manual certification process.

https://aisel.aisnet.org/hicss-53/st/cybersecurity_and_sw_assurance/3