Credible Information Sharing in Supply Chains - A Behavioral Assessment of Review Strategies

Credible Information Sharing in Supply Chains - A Behavioral Assessment of Review Strategies

Grand Wailea, Hawaii

In laboratory experiments, we compare the ability of trigger strategies with that of (relatively complex) review strategies to coordinate capacity decisions in supply chains when demand forecasts are based on private information. While trigger strategies punish apparently uncooperative behavior (misstated demand forecasts) immediately, review strategies only punish when apparently misstated information culminates over several periods. We contribute to the existing literature on capacity coordination in supply chains by showing that repeated game strategies lead to a significant degree of forecast misrepresentation, although they theoretically support the truth-telling equilibrium. However, forecast misrepresentation is more pronounced in review strategies. This behavioral effect is diametrically opposed to the theoretically predicted benefit of review strategies.

https://aisel.aisnet.org/hicss-52/da/decision_support_for_scm/3