Abstract
This study investigates whether the amendment of Regulation Crowdfunding (Reg CF) affects overinvestment in reward-based crowdfunding. Overinvestment, defined as a project raising more funds than its predefined goal, is a critical phenomenon with implications for project execution and resource allocation, yet its relationship with regulatory changes remains underexplored. Using 26,152 projects from Indiegogo, we employ difference-in-differences analysis to estimate the amendment’s causal effect. Results show the amendment exerts heterogeneous impacts on overinvestment, depending on different levels of funding goal. These findings contribute to literature on crowdfunding regulation and overinvestment, highlighting that regulatory effects depend on project traits. Practically, this study informs regulators to tailor safeguards (e.g., stricter evaluations for low-goal projects), guides platforms to enhance screening, and advises entrepreneurs on compliance strategies, advancing understanding of regulatory roles in crowdfunding efficiency.
Recommended Citation
Liu, Na; Guo, Yanping; Liu, Xiaomin; Yang, Chaofan; Xiong, Bingqing; and Fu, Mengyao, "Will the Amendment of Regulation Crowdfunding Inhibit
Overinvestment? Evidence from Indiegogo" (2025). ACIS 2025 Proceedings. 46.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2025/46