In a two-level supply chain with one manufacturer and m retailers, considering different risk attitudes of retailers, this paper designs an information sharing incentive model by using principal-agent theory and makes a comparative analysis of information sharing incentive validity conditions under symmetric and asymmetric information. Results show that information sharing incentive validity conditions will be much harsher in the case of asymmetric information and retailers tend to take “lazy” action. In the case of symmetric information, information sharing incentive validity conditions are irrelevant to retailers’ different risk attitudes while under asymmetric information is not the case; Regardless of whether the information is symmetrical or not, manufacturers always actively share information.
Lou, Yuying and Liu, Zhenyu, "RESEARCH ON INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR INFORMATION SHARING IN SUPPLY CHAIN WITH MULTI-RETAILER PARTICIPANTS" (2016). PACIS 2016 Proceedings. 39.