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In this paper, considering a cross-border e-retail supply chain composed by a foreign supplier and a cross-border e-retailer, we study the impact of different power structures on the supply chain members’ pricing and profits by establishing foreign supplier Stackelberg (FSS), cross-border e-retailer Stackelberg (CES) and vertical Nash (VN) game model on the basis of discussing O2O dual-channel retail mode and pricing decision. The results show that: i) the cross-border e-retailer prefer to choose the centralized pricing mode and will gain more profit than that in the decentralized pricing mode under the condition of O2O dual-channel retailing. ii) The impact of Stackelberg game on dual channel pricing of the cross-border e-retailer is identical, but the impact of three games on foreign supplier’s pricing is significant, (i.e., the wholesale price of the foreign supplier becomes smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually). iii) The impact of three games on cross-border electronic supply chain members’ profits is significant (i.e., members’ profits become smaller with the game dominance decreased gradually. In addition, the impact of Stackelberg game on supply chain total profits is identical. However, the supply chain total profits under Vertical Nash game are more than Stackelberg game.