Abstract
We present business-to-business electronic auction mechanism as an alternative to sales usually accomplished through negotiation. The mechanism allows bids that are incompletely specified yet provide an evaluative framework to facilitate the allocation of complementary goods when substitutes are available. The auction form allows the consumer to create a unique combination of goods upon which to place a multiple criteria bid. Bidders are given the flexibility to change and or modify their bids and bundles until a stopping criterion has been reached. The allocation to bidders requires solving a complex combinatorial problem in realtime. Since the proposed integer program model may become computationally intractable as the number of bidders increase, we present simplifying heuristics to make the problem manageable on a large scale.
Recommended Citation
Jones, Joni L. and Koehler, Gary J., "Multiple Criteria Combinatorial Auction: A B2B Allocation Mechanism for Substitute Goods" (2000). AMCIS 2000 Proceedings. 301.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2000/301