In this paper, we analyze negotiations of investment shares in interorganizational supply chains. To formulate the research issue more precisely, we develop a taxonomy of enterprise networks in general. We propose an investment sharing model that makes use of Shapley values as indicators of relative negotiation power in a network. It turns out that a focal buyer (supplier) in a supply chain can reduce investment shares and by that increase profits from the network if the number of non-focal suppliers (buyers) increases. However, this effect is connected with distortions of investment incentives and makes investment decisions difficult to implement. In the presence of additional coordination costs to support a certain supplier (buyer) base, an optimal number of suppliers (buyers) exists. As a large part of investments for interorganizational supply chains often concerns information and communication systems and technologies, these results are particularly important in the field of information management.
Schober, Franz, "Negotiation of Investment Shares in Interorganizational Supply Chains: A Game-Theoretic Approach" (2005). ICIS 2005 Proceedings. 47.