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Start Date

16-8-2018 12:00 AM

Description

This study primarily focuses on pay-to-bid auctions in which bidders pay a fixed fee for each bid to increase the price and explores the reputation of bidders within the auctions. The reputation effects can be discovered from sample observations in pay-to-bid auction websites. Pay-to-bid auctions are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviors by an aggressive bidder. To explain the phenomenon, a basic model in which two bidders take part in a series of pay-to-bid auctions is developed and an extension of a multi-player model builds on the basic model. The question of an optimal auction from the auctioneer’s standpoint, in an asymmetric setting, is addressed. It is expected to theoretically show that the results from previous symmetric pay-to-bid auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively.

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Aug 16th, 12:00 AM

Reputation in Repeated Pay-to-Bid Auctions

This study primarily focuses on pay-to-bid auctions in which bidders pay a fixed fee for each bid to increase the price and explores the reputation of bidders within the auctions. The reputation effects can be discovered from sample observations in pay-to-bid auction websites. Pay-to-bid auctions are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviors by an aggressive bidder. To explain the phenomenon, a basic model in which two bidders take part in a series of pay-to-bid auctions is developed and an extension of a multi-player model builds on the basic model. The question of an optimal auction from the auctioneer’s standpoint, in an asymmetric setting, is addressed. It is expected to theoretically show that the results from previous symmetric pay-to-bid auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively.