Abstract
The supervision of P2P lending platforms has always been a hot topic. However, if the government regulates the platform too strictly, it would restrain the subjective initiative of Internet financial innovation, and if the government overstimulates the platform, it might lead to systemic financial risks. From the perspective of government double objective optimization, this article sets a specific scene and analyzes the policy choice of supervision and incentive of P2P platform through game theory modeling and numerical simulation. Two schemes are offered, respectively, “First regulate and then motivate” and “First motivate and then regulate”. The results show that the government should first motivate and then regulate the P2P lending platforms, so as to achieve the government's dual objective optimization and utility maximization. Moreover, the investment of supervision and incentive should be adjusted continuously with the development of the industry.
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Ning; Wang, Wuyu; and Wang, Xi, "Research on Balance Strategy of Supervision and Incentive of P2P Lending Platform" (2018). PACIS 2018 Proceedings. 44.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2018/44