Paper Number
ECIS2026-2538
Paper Type
CRP
Abstract
This study investigates how powerful digital platform owners, designated as “gatekeepers” under the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, strategically adapt their governance mechanisms in response to ex-ante regulatory obligations. Using Apple as a revelatory case, we analyze the interplay between formal compliance, strategic containment, and reactive and obstructive strategies. Our findings reveal that while Apple made observable changes to comply with the regulation, such as enabling alternative app stores and payment systems, the platform owners simultaneously employed strategies to limit the impact of these changes on their position of power. These include imposing economic disincentives, creating procedural friction, and employing behavioral nudges. Public policymakers can use these insights to close enforcement gaps and develop more effective regulations. We contribute to literature by illustrating the dynamic evolution of platform governance and power under regulatory pressure and highlighting the challenges regulators face in addressing the open texture of law.
Recommended Citation
Heimburg, Vincent; Verlooy, Victorine; Staudacher, Florian; and Schreieck, Maximilian, "The Gatekeeper’s Gambit: How Platforms Strategically Adapt To Platform Regulation" (2026). ECIS 2026 Proceedings. 5.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2026/is_policy/is_policy/5
The Gatekeeper’s Gambit: How Platforms Strategically Adapt To Platform Regulation
This study investigates how powerful digital platform owners, designated as “gatekeepers” under the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, strategically adapt their governance mechanisms in response to ex-ante regulatory obligations. Using Apple as a revelatory case, we analyze the interplay between formal compliance, strategic containment, and reactive and obstructive strategies. Our findings reveal that while Apple made observable changes to comply with the regulation, such as enabling alternative app stores and payment systems, the platform owners simultaneously employed strategies to limit the impact of these changes on their position of power. These include imposing economic disincentives, creating procedural friction, and employing behavioral nudges. Public policymakers can use these insights to close enforcement gaps and develop more effective regulations. We contribute to literature by illustrating the dynamic evolution of platform governance and power under regulatory pressure and highlighting the challenges regulators face in addressing the open texture of law.
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