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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT COMPARISON BETWEEN USA AND CHINESE IT PROFESSIONALS

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Abstract

This study examine the perceived psychological contract from the perspectives of IT new recruits that are located in USA and China. Psychological contract emphasize the mutual exchange between employees and employers. The results of this exploratory study reveals that IT employees from China and USA hold many similar beliefs on the employer-employee obligations such as employer obligations to high pay, job autonomy, exciting project and long term job security. US IT recruits as a whole hold stronger emphasis than Chinese counterparts when dealing with career development, personal support, motivating boss and providing project milestone bonus. Findings also suggest that although employees can be from the same overarching culture such as Chinese culture that emphasizes collectivism, there exist strong subcultures even in the same country. IT professionals in Shanghai tend to have beliefs that are sometimes close to the US IT professionals than to their fellow IT professionals in Beijing

Keywords: Psychological contract, IT outsourcing offshore, IT professionals in developing country

Introduction

Information technology (IT) professionals are facing tremendous job stress nowadays. As a soft economy continues to threaten the corporate earnings, corporations are under enormous pressure to cut cost and downsize while still trying to deliver the best possible products and service constantly demanded by their customers. With the promise of dramatic wage savings, many companies are choosing to outsource business functions offshore, in particular, their IT development and maintenance functions. According to a report from IDC, it predicts that U.S. outsourcing spending will grow from \$56 billion in 1999 to \$87 billion in 2004 with offshore outsourcing accounting for part of the increase (Burrell, 2001). The immediate implications to such practice are at least two fold. First, current domestic IT employees may feel that companies violate the implicit psychological contract between employee and employer in terms of loyalty, job security, compensation and career development (Rousseau, 1989). Second, companies who choose to outsourcing IT offshore also face many uncalculated risk such as geopolitical instability, unclear overseas employee expectations for employers and uncertainty of employee commitment to quality performance and protection of employer's proprietary information from their competitors.

Psychological contract is the essence of the employment contract (Rousseau, 1989) and it binds together employees and employers and helps regulate their behaviour to achieve organization goals (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994). It can be particularly salient to IT professionals since the second wave of globalization is partially targeted to move the IT jobs overseas while the first wave of the job migration has mainly focused on moving jobs from the assembly line workers and minimum wage earners to overseas (Engardio, Bernstein and Kripalani, 2003). Many IT professionals viewed such decision to move IT offshore as broken promises by the companies to directly threaten their job security and undermine the importance of their profession and training.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether IT professionals in different countries or cultures have similar perception or belief of their obligations to their employers and their employer's obligations to them. We choose to study this question with the IT professionals from the United States (USA) and China. According to Gartner report (ITworld.com, 2002), China will be one of the top three countries for overseas IT outsourcing in the near future. Microsoft, even though skeptical about outsourcing IT jobs in the beginning, has just announced in February 2003 the investment of \$750 million in China for the next few years in areas such as education and training, software outsourcing and strategic investment in local software companies according to the a news

release from the People's Daily (Anonymous, 2002). With the estimated 400 -800,000 IT professionals in China, China becomes an important and ideal study site.

Literature Review

Psychological Contract: Psychological contract was first introduced into the literature in the 1960s by Argyris (1960) and Levenson (1963). The psychological contract is an implicit contract between an individual and his/her organization, which specifies the reciprocal obligations between an individual and the organization about what each expects to give and receive from each other in their exchange relationship. It is quite different from the legal or labour contract because the former is perceptual in nature while the later is written in specific and legally bounded language and terms. It is also different from employer-focused obligations evident in some of the state-owned enterprises where employees are not obligated or expected to contribute in order to receive benefits. While new employees can have clear expectations of what kind of technical skills they will give to their new employers, it may not be clear to them how much they are willing to receive the company's value as their own (Kotter, 1973) or how they should behave beyond their specific job duties.

There are various forms of inducements and contributions that psychological contracts may take. MacNeil (1985) and Rousseau (1989) categorizes and clusters different aspects of terms or obligations into transactional and relational. Transactional aspects of inducements from employers emphasize specific, short term, monetary obligations such as high pay, reward based on performance, rapid career advancement. Transactional aspects of contributions from employees emphasize basic obligations such as giving advance notice if quitting, refusing to support organization's competitors and protecting employer's proprietary information. Relational contracts, on the other hand, focus on broad, long-term, socio-emotional obligations. Employees expect employer to provide long-term job security, support with personal problems and opportunities for career development. In return, employees are obligated to work extra hours when needed, to be loyal and to volunteer on nonrequired tasks.

Another variation of psychological contract that exists uniquely for IT professionals is related to terms that support IT-specific performance. IT employees may feel that employer is obligated to reward them if they have worked hard and earned IT certifications or reward them based on project milestone accomplishment. Because of the rapid technological advancement, IT employees may believe that employers are obligated to provide opportunity to work with leading-edge technologies. In the same realm, employees are obliged to keep their skill set up to date and complete assignments on time (Chin, Nelson and Todd, 2000).

Cross-Cultural Differences: While empirical research on cross-cultural differences in psychological contract is limited, differences between the United States and China both in their cultural traditions and socioeconomic environments suggest that employees of the two countries are likely to have very different perceptions on the nature of employer-employee relations both in terms of employer obligations and employee obligations. Culturally, the U.S. represents the epitome of a tradition which stresses the independence of individuals and the specific, contractual nature of relationships amongst individuals and relationships between individuals and organizations (Hofstede, 1980; Thomas, Au, & Ravlin, 2000). In contrast, the Chinese have long embraced a collectivistic philosophy that stresses the interdependence and long-term mutual obligations amongst individuals and between individuals and organizations (Meindl, Hunt, & Lee, 1989; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). From the sociocultural perspective, prior to the introduction of reform programs in the later 1970s, China operated under a centrally planned and monitored economic system which imposed very little incentives for organizations and individuals to produce economic results. This system had over time cultivated the tendency of dependence among Chinese employees who expected their enterprises to provide not only lifetime employment, but also welfare provisions including pensions, housing, paid sick leave, meal services, recreation facilities, healthcare, daycare and school (Walder, 1986; Zhu, 1995). Despite the provision of such extensive benefits, Chinese employees did not develop a very strong commitment to their work, as reflected by their low level of work efforts and productivity (Stapanek, 1992; Yeung & Wong, 1990), and frequent use of work hours to run personal errands (Beck & Beck, 1990; Stapanek, 1992; Yeung et al., 1990). Substantial changes have been introduced since 1979 to China's employment system to alter the existing level of employees' expectations for organizationally-provided job security and welfare benefits. Guaranteed lifelong employment has to a great extent been dismantled and the practices of non-performance based egalitarian reward system in organizations are being challenged (Bu & Xu, 2000; Child, 1994; Warner, 1993, 1995). Despite these change initiatives, we predict that cultural traditions and institutional arrangements are deeply embedded in the cognitive schema of what a typical employment relationship holds amongst Chinese employees. Thus, we predict that Chinese IT recruits are likely to have a stronger emphasis on the relational aspect of the employer obligations such as long term job security, a weaker emphasis on the transactional aspect of the employer obligation and both the transactional and relational aspects of the employee obligations.

- P1a: USA IT recruits have stronger emphasis on transactional employer obligations
- P1b: Chinese IT recruits have stronger emphasis on relational employer obligations
- P1c: USA IT recruits have stronger emphasis on relational employee obligations
- P1d: USA IT recruits have stronger emphasis on transactional employee obligations

Regional Difference: China is, however, not a monolithic entity. The historical subcultural differences between the two largest cities of China, Beijing and Shanghai, are widely acknowledged by the Chinese themselves (Yang, 1994; Yu, 1992). Redfield & Singer (1969) classified Beijing as an “administrative-cultural city” which is dominated by the literati and bureaucrats serving the political and administrative needs of the central government, and Shanghai as a metropolis-city which is led by a managerial and entrepreneurial class emerged as a result of dynamic economic activities and overseas connections. The differences between Beijing and Shanghai are believed to have amplified after the lift of tight central control by the government in the early 1990s and Shanghai gained measurable economic autonomy. Shanghai, once again, became the centre where China meets the West, not only reflected in the size of foreign investment but also in the presence of western music, fashion, and life styles. Therefore, we expect that, Sino-US differences discussed above notwithstanding, Shanghai IT recruits’ expectations of employer-employee obligations are likely to locate between those of their Beijing and US counterparts.

P2a There are differences in perceived employer-employee obligations among new IT recruits in Shanghai and, Beijing. (Two regional comparison)

P2b. In comparison of the perceived employer-employee obligations, the perception of new IT recruits from Shanghai tend to position between their counterparts in the US and Beijing.

Methods

Participants

The analysis in this paper is based on questionnaire responses from 395 U.S. and Chinese undergraduate students majoring in the fields of information technology (including computer science, management information systems and automation). The U.S. data were obtained from a sample of students enrolled in a major university in the Midwest region of the U.S. Of the 158 questionnaires distributed, 121 (76.6%) were completed and returned. The Chinese data were drawn from two universities, one in Shanghai and another in Beijing. Among the 250 questionnaires distributed in Shanghai, 203 (81.2%) were completed and returned. Among the 330 questionnaires distributed in Beijing, 200 (60.6%) were completed and returned. We focus on undergraduate students only in this paper, and therefore, responses from those other than undergraduate students were excluded from the analysis. This yielded 94 responses from the U.S., 173 from Shanghai and 128 from Beijing, of which 63.6% were from men. On average, the respondents included in this study were 22.3 years of age. The results of ANOVA with Student-Newman-Keuls multiple comparisons showed that the two samples from China were of similar age (Mean = 22.5), but they were significantly older than the US sample (Mean = 21.7). The three groups also differed in terms of sex composition ($\chi^2 = 85.23, p < .001$). The Shanghai sample contained a higher proportion of male respondents (90.2%) than did the U.S. sample (57.4%), which included a higher proportion of male respondents than the Beijing sample (40.6%).

Measure

Obligations: We adopted items developed by Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau (1994) for transactional and relational obligations. Using seven-point Likert scale (1, “do not believe at all,” to 7, “totally believe”), perceived employer obligations were measured by asking new recruits to what extent they believe their employers were obligated to provide them with the following items: rapid advancement, high pay, merit pay, training, long-term job security, career development and support. Perceived employee obligations were measured by using the same seven point Likert scale and by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which their obligations to their employers: completing assignment on time, working extra hours, loyalty, volunteering to do nonrequired tasks, giving advance notice if quitting, willingness to accept a job transfer, not supporting competitors, protecting proprietary information and working a minimum of two years in the organization. The items that were used to measure the IT specific employer obligations are based on IS personnel literature such as providing financial reward if employee earn/pass IT certifications, project milestone-based bonus, exciting projects to work on, opportunity to work on leading-edge technologies, autonomy to manage work, a new employee orientation and motivating boss.

The questionnaire used in China was initially written in English for the USA respondents and later translated into Mandarin for Chinese respondents by three Chinese doctoral students pursuing their degrees in IT and organizational behavior areas.

Results

When cross-cultural comparisons rely on subjects' self-reported degree of endorsement of given statements, there is the danger that the data may be contaminated because subjects from different cultures exhibit varying degrees of acquiescence when responding to questionnaires (Hofstede, 1980). We adopted the standardization procedure used by Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1994) which essentially equates the average degree of endorsement for each individual. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations of all the standardized items and reliability coefficients of the self-efficacy and perceived mobility scales.

As indicated in Table 1, the reliability coefficients of both self-efficacy and perceived mobility scales were satisfactory. Employer obligations and employee obligations were factor-analyzed separately with principal components extraction and varimax rotation. However, there exist no distinct patterns of transactional and relational clustering that are similar with the results from the study by Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau. Since there are few empirical studies about the psychological contract to empirically and consistently validate these clustering conceptualizations and these individual obligations, we decided to analyze each item independently as did Robinson et al. (1994).

To test the propositions regarding differences in perceived employer obligations between the three locations, we again conducted univariate ANOVAs with each item of the perceived employer and employee obligations as the dependent variable. Since the three groups of students were not identical in terms of their age, previous work experience and number of job offers, and self-efficacy and perceived mobility correlated with a substantial number of the dependent variables, we entered age, previous jobs, job offers, self-efficacy, and perceived mobility as covariates in each of the ANOVAs. Sex, location and their interaction were treated as fixed factors. These ANOVA results are reported in Table 2. Table 2 also lists the results of multiple comparisons of across three locations.

With respect to the transactional aspect of the employer obligations, there was significant effect of location on advancement but not those of sex or the interaction between location and sex, after controlling for the effects of age, previous jobs, job offers, self-efficacy and perceived mobility. Multiple comparisons showed that US employees rated significantly higher the employer's obligation in providing rapid career advancement for employees than their counterparts in Shanghai or Beijing, which is consistent with the prediction in P1a. There was a significant effect of the interaction between location and sex on merit pay. While Shanghai women perceived a stronger obligation for employer to offer merit pay than US or Beijing women, there was no significant difference across the three locations among men. This does not support the prediction in P1a. There were also no significant effects of location, sex or the interaction between sex and location with regard to high pay, which also does not support P1a. Therefore P1a received only partial support.

Turning to perceived employee obligations, we found significant interaction effects of location and sex on transfer, no competitor support, proprietary protection, and minimum stay. There were no cross location differences among male recruits in all these four transactional aspects of employee obligations. Women in Beijing and Shanghai rated employee obligation to accepting job transfers significantly higher than their US peers, which contradicts P1c. Women in US and Shanghai rated employee obligations to refuse to support their organizations' competitors much higher than their counterparts in Beijing, which supports P1c partially. Women in Shanghai rated more highly the employee's obligation to protect employer's proprietary information than their peers in US and Beijing, which does not support P1c. Employee's obligation to spend a minimum of two years with the same employer was rated higher by recruits in Beijing than those in Shanghai, who in turn rated this employee obligation higher than those in US. This does not support P1c. We found no significant difference across location on the relational aspect of the employee obligation, including willingness to work extra hours, to be loyal and to volunteer to do nonrequired tasks. P1d was not supported. P2 which predicted that the perception on employer and employee obligation among Shanghai recruits would differ from their counterparts in Beijing in a direction which make the perception of the Shanghai recruits closer to the US recruits. The proposition was supported with regard to employer obligation to assist with employee development and employee obligations to give advance notice before quitting, completing assignments on time, and keeping skills up to date. Therefore, P2 received partial support. We also added a set of items on employer and employee obligations which are IT-specific. With respect to employer obligation, there was an interaction effect between location and sex on employer obligation to provide new employee orientation. However, a close examination did not show any significant difference across locations among either men or women. There were also no significant differences across locations in perceived employer obligation to provide financial reward for earning IT certificate,

job autonomy, exciting projects or opportunity to work on leading-edge technology. However, compared with their US counterparts, Chinese recruits in both Beijing and Shanghai rated the employer obligation to offer project milestone-based bonus significantly higher, but the employer obligation to provide highly motivating boss significantly lower. With respect to employee obligation in IT-specific areas, US recruits rated significantly higher their obligation to complete assignment on time than the Chinese recruits in Shanghai and Beijing. Beijing recruits rated significantly higher their obligation to keep their skill set up to date than their peers in US and Shanghai.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study examine the perceived psychological contract from the perspectives of IT new recruits that are located in USA and China. Psychological contract emphasize the mutual exchange between employees and employers. The study of psychological contract in the IS area is important because most of the IS personnel research has focus on the employee commitment to their employers but not on the employers obligations as perceived by their employees. This perspective uniquely focuses on the mutual exchange within their relationship. This study also examines the cultural and sub cultural influences on the perceived employer-employee obligations. As organizations are outsourcing their IT functions to overseas, managers have to manage IT professionals from different cultures and belief and value systems that may create different perceptions of the employer-employee obligations.

The results of this exploratory study reveals that IT employees from China and USA hold many similar beliefs on the employer-employee obligations such as employer obligations to high pay, job autonomy, exciting project and long term job security. This phenomenon is in line with other studies while in the process of economy reform, Chinese has successfully helped transforming many human resource practices in China closer to the market-oriented human resource management systems which resemble the ones practiced in the US (Bu et al., 2000; Zhu & Dowling, 2002; Zhu, 1995). These similarities are particular salient when comparing with male IT professionals across the board. Males in three regions perceived their employer-employee obligations similarly. However, there are also beliefs that US IT recruits as a whole hold stronger emphasis than Chinese counterparts when dealing with career development, personal support, motivating boss and providing project milestone bonus. Findings also suggest that although employees can be from the same overarching culture such as Chinese culture that emphasizes collectivism, there exist strong subcultures even in the same country. IT professionals in Shanghai tend to have beliefs that are sometimes close to the US IT professionals than to their fellow IT professionals in Beijing. Managers should be aware of such differences when managing overseas IT employees.

This study attempted to use the transactional and relational clustering categories as suggested by Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau (1994) to examine the employee's perceived psychological contract but the factor analysis failed to support such conceptualization. Even though the factor analysis results from Robinson et al. support their conceptualization, they instead examine each obligations individually since these are their primary constructs of interests (p.146). More research should be conducted to empirically validate such notion.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations^a

Variable	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	
Perceived employer obligations																															
Transactional																															
1. High pay	-.22	.85																													
2. Merit pay	.59	.89	.09																												
3. Advancement	-.30	.98	.35	-.07																											
Relational																															
4. Job security	-.13	.91	-.13	-.16	-.09																										
5. Training	.52	.87	-.11	.32	-.07	.07																									
6. Development	.09	.88	-.11	-.26	-.13	.22	-.08																								
7. Support	-.61	1.09	-.17	-.33	-.06	.07	-.26	-.02																							
IT-specific																															
8. Financial reward for obtaining IT certificate	-.16	.94	-.08	-.18	.07	-.03	-.18	-.05	.09																						
9. Project-milestone bonus	.06	.84	-.08	.19	-.12	-.25	-.11	-.19	-.04	.04																					
10. Boss who motivates	-.18	.97	-.13	-.25	-.12	-.12	-.14	-.02	-.09	-.13	-.20																				
11. New employee orientation	.37	.91	-.24	-.01	-.33	-.12	.06	-.03	-.09	-.20	-.05	.10																			
12. Autonomy	.15	.89	-.26	.01	-.27	-.14	-.15	-.14	-.10	-.21	.05	-.02	.22																		
13. Exciting project	-.16	.84	-.02	-.03	-.14	-.19	-.13	-.17	-.09	-.10	.09	-.03	-.15	-.03																	
14. Working on leading-edge technology	-.10	.85	-.02	-.26	-.05	-.14	-.16	-.01	-.09	-.06	-.28	.07	-.12	.05	.09																
Perceived employee obligations																															
Transactional																															
15. Advance quitting notice	.22	.88	-.01	.14	.06	-.03	.13	-.08	-.14	-.09	-.04	.09	-.00	.04	-.03	-.04															
16. Transfers	-.09	.86	-.14	-.06	-.14	.02	.05	-.00	.12	-.10	.09	-.02	-.02	.07	.10	.03	-.05														
17. No competitor support	.01	.86	-.02	.05	-.03	.08	.12	-.01	.01	-.19	.06	-.19	.06	.14	.00	-.08	-.06	-.17													
18. Proprietary protection	.48	.82	.01	.20	-.15	-.04	.09	-.03	-.13	-.05	.03	-.01	.17	.07	-.05	-.09	-.14	-.11	.00												
19. Minimum stay	-.60	.99	.10	-.24	.13	.16	-.21	.02	.30	.17	-.06	.01	-.19	-.17	-.13	.03	-.09	-.01	-.17	-.20											
Relational																															
20. Overtime	-.31	.99	.07	-.21	.24	-.01	-.23	-.02	.15	.11	-.05	.08	-.16	-.12	-.05	.14	-.24	-.17	-.25	-.19	-.04										
21. Loyalty	.13	.79	.07	.09	.04	-.01	-.06	.04	-.03	.14	-.03	-.06	.03	-.09	-.05	.02	-.11	-.21	-.03	-.12	.13										
22. Extrarole behavior	-.41	.94	.11	-.05	.14	-.07	-.15	-.02	.18	.09	-.06	.04	-.21	-.06	-.02	.03	-.07	-.10	-.17	-.23	.02	.10	.05								
IT specific																															
23. Completion of assignment on time	.40	.89	-.11	.17	-.19	-.06	.19	.04	-.34	-.08	.01	-.00	.24	.14	.13	-.06	.03	-.18	.02	.11	-.35	-.25	-.22	-.41							
24. Keeping skill up to date	.18	.82	-.09	-.04	-.14	-.06	.11	.05	-.19	-.01	.07	.05	.14	-.00	.11	.07	-.11	-.17	-.17	-.13	-.09	-.15	-.15	-.25	.28						

Variable	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
Control variables																														
25. Self-efficacy	5.02	1.17	.16	.11	.07	-.05	.00	-.03	-.12	.04	.10	-.16	-.08	-.08	.04	.04	.01	-.08	-.14	-.01	-.09	.14	.01	-.03	.09	.10	(.84)			
26. Perceived mobility	4.89	1.08	.13	.16	-.02	-.01	.03	.04	-.11	-.05	.15	.19	-.00	-.07	.03	-.03	.03	-.05	-.10	.07	-.16	.04	.03	-.03	.06	.04	.56	(.75)		
27. Previous jobs	1.45	3.32	-.12	.11	.04	-.08	.11	-.02	-.12	-.08	.01	.01	.10	.09	-.03	-.02	.02	-.05	-.04	.11	-.18	-.03	.13	-.04	.11	.01	.01			
28. Job offers	2.35	5.01	-.05	.08	.04	-.08	-.07	-.04	.01	-.04	.12	-.10	-.10	.09	.11	.04	.05	.06	.08	.13	-.09	-.02	-.06	-.04	.04	-.14	.13	.04	.04	
29. Age	22.31	1.76	.08	-.05	-.02	.01	-.07	.01	.09	.01	-.06	.08	-.09	-.05	-.03	.06	-.06	.06	.07	.04	-.10	-.09	-.15	.00	.05	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.56	.17

^a N = 314. Correlations above .10 are significant at the .10 level; correlations above .11 are significant at the .05 level; correlations above .15 are significant at the .01 level; correlations above .19 are significant at the .001 level. The reliability coefficients for the self-efficacy and perceived mobility scales are presented in the diagonal in parentheses.

Table 2: ANOVAs and Contrasts (standardized)

	Location		Sex		Sex x Location	Age	Previous Job	Offer	Self-efficacy	Perceived mobility
	F	Contrast	F	Contrast	F	F	F	F	F	F
High pay	2.75	US=SH=BJ	2.34	M=F	.56	.38	1.40	.02	2.17	.78
Merit pay	2.17	M: US=SH; SH=BJ; US>BJ F: US=BJ<SH	3.78	US: F=M SH: F>M BJ: M=F	7.30**	.00	1.67	.63	.02	3.22
Advancement	3.25*	US>SH=BJ	.18	M=F	.53	.00	.00	1.56	1.38	.81
Job security	.27	US=SH=BJ	.23	M=F	2.08	.40	2.77	.28	.73	.08
Training	3.54*	M: US=SH=BJ F: US=SH>BJ	5.08*	US: F>M SH: F>M BJ: M>F	8.46** *	.01	.35	.18	.08	.83
Development	3.04*	US=SH<BJ	3.42	M=F	1.04	.17	.29	.04	.58	.33
Support	13.61** *	M: SH>US=BJ F: US<SH=BJ	.04	US: M=F SH: M=F BJ: F>M	7.19*	.01	.71	.83	1.17	2.10
Financial reward for obtaining IT certificate	1.94	US=SH=BJ	.03	M=F	1.61	.06	1.57	.13	1.19	2.40
Project-milestone bonus	10.30** *	US<SH=BJ	.63	M=F	.34	1.82	.08	1.52	.28	3.04
Boss who motivates	3.44*	US>SH=BJ	.31	M=F	2.60	4.29	.77	3.40	.22	4.37*
New employee orientation	.12	M: US=SH=BJ F: US=SH=BJ	.81	US: F=M SH: F=M BJ: M=F	3.13*	.04	1.36	2.43	1.28	.89
Autonomy	1.12	US=SH=BJ	.07	M=F	.79	.00	1.78	.46	.82	.11
Exciting project	1.05	US=SH=BJ	2.39	M=F	.39	1.29	.54	1.75	.41	.04
Working on leading-edge technology	.88	US=SH=BJ	4.06*	M>F	.35	1.39	.30	.05	.42	.21

	Location		Sex		Sex x Location	Age	Previous Job	Offer	Self-efficacy	Perceived mobility
	F	Contrast	F	Contrast	F	F	F	F	F	F
Advance quitting notice	5.36**	US=SH; SH=BJ; US>BJ	.10	M=F	.07	.99	.70	1.79	.46	.89
Transfers	10.90** *	M: US=SH=BJ F: US<SH=BJ	.65	US: M=F SH: M=F BJ: M=F	3.13	.04	.04	.03	1.11	.03
No competitor support	.38	M: US=SH=BJ F: US=SH>BJ	.52	US: F=M SH: F=M BJ: M>F	4.30*	.25	.05	2.29	7.85**	2.71
Proprietary protection	2.51	M: US=SH=BJ F: SH>US=BJ	6.50*	US: M=F SH: F>M BJ: F=M	4.18*	1.48	2.10	2.80	.68	3.19
Minimum stay	3.65*	M: US=SH=BJ F: US<SH<BJ	1.58	US: M=F SH: M=F BJ: F>M	9.23** *	.00	3.11	4.28*	.34	8.41**
Overtime	.29	US=SH=BJ	.24	M=F	1.17	2.49	1.12	.07	3.87*	.96
Loyalty	.47	US=SH=BJ	7.93**	M>F	.20	1.11	1.95	.44	.48	.74
Extrarole behavior	.38	US=SH=BJ	.49	M=F	1.01	.00	.10	.48	.22	.03
Completion of assignment on time	3.69*	US>SH=BJ	4.48	F>M	.73	4.06*	2.83	.58	1.74	.06
Keeping skill up to date	4.48*	US=SH<BJ	.08	M=F	1.64	.10	.01	2.55	4.86*	.54

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.