Location
260-055, Owen G. Glenn Building
Start Date
12-15-2014
Description
With the large amount of data available via different channels, firms have increasingly viewed information transparency as an important component of their strategy. This paper examines how the disclosure of winners' information affects sellers' revenues in multi-channel, B2B sequential auctions. Using a field experiment, we find that bidders tend to pay higher prices when winners' identities are concealed from public view. At the outset, such finding contradicts the prediction of the well-known linkage principle in auction theory. Our empirical analysis suggests that anonymizing winning bids might discourage tacit collusion and mitigate the declining price trend in these B2B sequential auctions. This paper contributes to the growing literature on information transparency in market design. It also provides valuable insights to practitioners in designing information revelation policies in complex B2B markets.
Recommended Citation
Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; and Heck, Eric van, "Information Transparency in Multi-Channel B2B Auctions: A Field Experiment" (2014). ICIS 2014 Proceedings. 42.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2014/proceedings/EBusiness/42
Information Transparency in Multi-Channel B2B Auctions: A Field Experiment
260-055, Owen G. Glenn Building
With the large amount of data available via different channels, firms have increasingly viewed information transparency as an important component of their strategy. This paper examines how the disclosure of winners' information affects sellers' revenues in multi-channel, B2B sequential auctions. Using a field experiment, we find that bidders tend to pay higher prices when winners' identities are concealed from public view. At the outset, such finding contradicts the prediction of the well-known linkage principle in auction theory. Our empirical analysis suggests that anonymizing winning bids might discourage tacit collusion and mitigate the declining price trend in these B2B sequential auctions. This paper contributes to the growing literature on information transparency in market design. It also provides valuable insights to practitioners in designing information revelation policies in complex B2B markets.