Software Vulnerabilities: Open Source versus Proprietary Software Security

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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to empirically investigate specific security characteristics of both open source software and proprietary software. Operating system software vulnerability data spanning several years are collected and analyzed to determine if significant differences exist in terms of inter-arrival times of published vulnerabilities and patch releases. Open source software is only marginally quicker in releasing patches for reported vulnerabilities. The arguments favoring the inherent security of open source software do not appear to hold up to scrutiny. These findings provide evidence to security managers to focus more on holistic software security management, irrespective of the proprietary-nature of the underlying software.

Keywords
Open source software, information security, vulnerabilities.

INTRODUCTION
Open source software (OSS) has been cited as a possible solution to the information security problems and vulnerabilities often reported in propriety software. Open source software is software that by license provides unlimited access to the source code, so that the source code can be examined and modified according to the user’s wishes. There are also prescriptions for the distribution of the software and subsequent modifications (Open Source Initiative, 2005). According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, supporters of open source software, particularly Linux, a pc-based operating system, viewed such software as less vulnerable to viruses and worms, making OSS a favorable choice over other operating systems, such as Windows XP (Bulkeley, 2004). Open source software is often developed and maintained by large numbers of volunteers. One of the oft promoted features of open source software is that the wide availability of source code, and hence the large number of critical eyes examining the source code, results in more robust and therefore more secure software and applications (Open Source Initiative, 2005). Many critics also suggest the push to market pressures among proprietary software vendors result in more problematic end products, including an increased number of software bugs and vulnerabilities. In light of these commonly-held beliefs, there is a growing perception that open source software, for example the various instantiations of the Linux operating system and various software applications, is inherently more secure, due to the freely available source code and greater levels of critical scrutiny.

The objective of this research is to empirically determine if there is any validity to the claim of OSS proponents that OSS is more secure, using vulnerability and patch data available for both open source and proprietary software. While well-designed and secure software is much more than the collection of vulnerability and patch release data, these metrics provide at least a preliminary look into potential problems with specific technologies. In this research we focus on operating systems software, such as Linux, Microsoft XP and Apple OS. Data have been collected for a number of years, including the most recent available. We investigate and address the counter-criticism that the reason open source software appears to be less vulnerable is that it simply is less of a target, both in terms of market share and length of time in the market.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The background of the open source versus proprietary software debate is examined in the Related Background section. We look at the context used to examine the data, including the software reliability literature. We also examine previous work in this area and differentiate the current research from this work. The research questions and framework are presented in the Research Questions section, followed by the methodology and
information about the data. Results and discussion follow next, while the final section concludes the study and presents ideas for future research.

Related Background

Open source software is defined as software whose source code is publicly available for free or a nominal charge. Depending on the specific license agreement, the source code may be modified and redistributed. Software whose source code is not openly published, usually are commercial software, which we refer to as proprietary software. As the executable code may be free or of nominal charge for either propriety or open source software, we limit the distinction to the source code. The software development and maintenance work carried out for open source software, is often voluntary and performed by any number of hobbyists and/or other interested parties. The incentives and motivation for volunteering time and effort to open source projects has been studied by Lerner and Tirole (2002) and Hann, Roberts, and Slaughter (2004). In general, career concerns and peer recognition are motivating factors for those involved in open source projects. Open source software was modeled using the theory of public goods by Johnson (2001) who reported inefficiencies in open source development and distribution as compared to proprietary software.

Any bug or error in a user-application or a network application that can be exploited to compromise a system, or cause a security breach, is termed a vulnerability. Vulnerabilities can be classified according to the types of problems or breaches it can cause, or the potential damage it may inflict. The problems or threats created by vulnerabilities are qualified based on the nature of possible security attacks and the level of severity of the attacks. Typically, developers working on software take preventive measures to counter these threats due to known vulnerabilities by releasing what is known as a fix or a patch to eliminate the vulnerability.

There are numerous issues with patching vulnerabilities. First of all, the vulnerability must be discovered and reported. There are different mechanisms by which vulnerabilities can be reported. For example, CERT (http://www.cert.org) is a partnership between the federal government and public and private companies, and acts as an infomediary between those who identify vulnerabilities and software users. The ICAT Metabase is a database maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (http://icat.nist.gov/icat.cfm) that stores and maintains vulnerability and patch information, collected from various other security advisories maintained by the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), Security Focus, Bugtraq, etc. There also exist market-based infomediaries such as iDefense (http://www.iDefense.com), providing incentives like monetary rewards for vulnerability identifiers. Arora, Telang and Xu (2004) examine a number of scenarios to study optimal vulnerability disclosure policy and find that the social welfare is maximized by the use of a neutral intermediary. However, there is a contingent of users who believe in immediate and full disclosure (http://lists.netsys.com/mailman/listinfo/full-disclosure). The chief concern is that if a particular vulnerability is known, an attack can be executed before affected systems are somehow patched or secured.

Next, a patch must be created, delivered or made accessible to all relevant users of the affected systems. The current system of patch delivery depends on the particular source or vendor of the technology. Some might be automatically located and applied via the Internet, whereas others might require far more work and expertise to locate. Third, the patch must be applied once it is obtained. While some patches and updates are simple to download and install, others have been known to cause further problems and system instability, for example Microsoft’s Service Pack 2 (SP2) (Sliwa, 2004). It has been conjectured that such patches might introduce further vulnerabilities as they are sometimes quickly put together without sufficient development and testing procedures.

The proliferation of patches in itself has resulted in a new area of practice and research, namely patch management. Certainly, keeping up with the volume of patches for various systems is no easy task for organizations. Intuitively, well-developed software that was engineered for both functionality and security should result in fewer bugs, and therefore, fewer vulnerabilities and subsequent patches. From a total cost of ownership (TCO) perspective, patching is quite expensive. Much effort is required to determine which patches should be downloaded and applied at what times, to which systems and follow-up must be performed to ensure adequate systems operations and stability (Silver and Pescatore, 2004). From a risk management perspective, the application of large numbers of patches implies that further problems, complexities and instability could be introduced to a system, therefore increasing the likelihood of more problems or failure. Both TCO and risk management dictate that fewer patches as a result of fewer vulnerabilities in software is desirable.

Open source software advocates claim that OSS is much less prone to attacks from viruses and other information security problems as there are fewer vulnerabilities to exploit. Others have proposed that the issue is more of simply being an interesting target to attack. For example, as Microsoft is the dominant player in the personal computer operating system market, (Hamm, 2005) they are the most interesting target for attackers and others with malevolent agendas. As Linux makes
further inroads into the PC operating system market space, will the various instantiations of Linux become popular targets for virus writers and other attackers as well? The next section sets forth several research questions, along with the research framework in which we attempt to address the research questions. The vulnerabilities and patching behaviors are then examined using these questions, in the Results and Discussion section.

Research Questions

The premise for this research has evolved from the concept of software reliability. Prior research examined software reliability from a technical viewpoint, and was often formulated as analytical models (Sumita and Shanthikumar, 1986). Software reliability studies have focused on such issues as mean time to failure and release times. For example, Jelinski and Moranda (1972) and Shooman (1973) presented a well-known reliability model that has its roots in hardware reliability. \( R(t) \) is the probability that no errors will occur from time 0 to time \( t \); this is the reliability function. \( F(t) \) is the failure function; the probability that an error will occur in the time interval 0 to \( t \).

\[
F(t) = 1 - R(t)
\]  
\( F(t) \) is the failure function; the probability that an error will occur in the time interval 0 to \( t \).

\[
f(t) = -dR(t)/dt
\]  
A hazard function \( z(t) \) can be defined as the conditional probability that an error occurs in the interval \( t \) to \( t + \Delta t \), assuming that the error did not occur before time \( t \). If \( T \) is the time that the error does occur,

\[
z(t)\Delta t = P[t < T < t + \Delta t \mid T > t]
\]  
This expression is equivalent to

\[
z(t)\Delta t = \frac{P[t < T < t + \Delta t]}{P[T > t]} = \frac{F(t + \Delta t) - F(t)}{R(t)}
\]  
Dividing both sides by \( \Delta t \) and taking the limit as \( \Delta t \) approaches zero,

\[
z(t) = f(t)/R(t) = \left[-dR(t)/dt\right]/R(t)
\]  
Solving for \( R(t) \) by setting \( R(0) = 1 \),

\[
R(t) = \exp\left(-\int_0^t z(x)dx\right)
\]  
and mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) is

\[
MTTF = \int_0^\infty R(t)dt
\]

Numerous extensions exist to this original model. Additionally, other models have been developed using different assumptions, such as error seeding models and complexity models (Myers, 1976). Banker, Datar, Kemerer, and Zweig (2002) point out that a major limitation of these models is that they offer little explanatory power. They proposed a conceptual model which attempts to better understand why errors occur or are introduced and determined that factors such as programmer experience, system volatility and complexity and frequency of minor modifications to the system impacted the error rates.

We are interested in software reliability from an information security viewpoint. Therefore, we consider the errors found in software to represent a superset of vulnerabilities that could lead to exploits and other security threats. We don’t know the exact size of the vulnerability set relative to the set of all errors, however given the advances in software engineering practices and automation, we assume that security vulnerabilities represent the large majority of errors discovered in software post-release. Therefore, the discovery of software errors or bugs and vulnerabilities and the subsequent release of patches appear as ideal starting points for examining the security and reliability of various types of software. Arora, Nandkumar, Krishnan, and Telang (2004) looked at vulnerabilities and frequency of attacks, focusing on vulnerability disclosure policies. From a decision-making perspective, two papers (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan, 2004; Beattie, Arnold, Cowan, Wagle, Wright and Shostack, 2002) examined the optimal time to apply a software patch. Evaluating software quality is critical in cost-effective
software maintenance (Boehm, Brown and Lipow, 1976) as too little quality translates into too much software life-cycle costs. In this research, we take an additional look at vulnerabilities and their fixes, in an attempt to compare open source and proprietary software, along the lines of software quality and reliability and gain insights into the development process of open source software. How well operating system vendors deal with security problems is bigger than just quick patch release and how easily the vendor enables administrators to apply those patches.

“…the key questions in judging operating systems are: how quickly does an operating system vendor fix public security vulnerabilities; how severe are those problems, compared with other vendors.....” (MIZI Research, 2004, p. 1)

Given that OSS source code is much more widely available, it is commonly believed that more critical eyes are examining open source software in its development and debugging (Diffie, 2003). If more individuals are involved in the development and maintenance of open source software, repairs or patches for problem in the software should be issued in less time than for proprietary software products. Based on this belief, we expect open source to be faster in its response to fixing bugs. Formally, we state Hypothesis 1 as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** Open source software developers issue patches faster than proprietary software vendors.

If patches are issued in closer time units to the discovery of the vulnerability, we can state that open source software is more secure from a patching perspective. This is due to the likelihood of a hacker being able to exploit an unpatched vulnerability as decreasing as the time required to issue a patch decreases. Conversely, the longer a particular vulnerability goes unpatched, the likelihood of a hacker exploiting such a vulnerability increases. Therefore, if patches are released relatively quickly, the more secure the software should be. This assumes that the patches are successfully applied immediately after release. Failure of software owners to apply patches is a topic for future research.

From a reliability/queuing perspective, the discovery of a vulnerability can be viewed as an arrival event. So, the inter-arrival times of vulnerabilities indicate the frequency of vulnerabilities that are discovered in unit time. Building on our initial belief about the inherent security of open source, we posit that the mean inter-arrival time of vulnerabilities will be greater for open source software. In other words, we expect to see fewer bugs being discovered in open-source systems, in unit time, reflecting their robustness. This leads to our second hypothesis,

**Hypothesis 2:** In unit time, there are fewer vulnerabilities in open source software compared to proprietary software.

The motivational profiles of open source and proprietary software developers have been widely studied based on theories of volunteerism and labor economics (Hann, Roberts and Slaughter, 2004; Lerner and Tirole, 2001). Open source software developers have been found to be more motivated to contribute and respond to the development process of open source software due to the apparent visibility of their contribution. This visibility provides an incentive to participate and consequentially brings in the desired recognition. These factors should all contribute to the higher levels of quality and resulting security of open source software.

**Data & Methodology**

Data for our analysis has been obtained from the ICAT database (ICAT, 2004) maintained by the security division of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list maintained by the Mitre Corporation (MITRE, 2004). The data set contains vulnerabilities/bugs discovered and patched/fixed between the period of January 2001 and May 2004.

As mentioned earlier, the focus of our study is on operating system software. Hence the dataset is classified as open source and proprietary, based on the underlying operating system software where the vulnerability has been discovered. The dates of discovery of the vulnerabilities and the dates when these bugs were fixed are recorded to obtain the response times of vendors to release a patch.

Approximately 700 vulnerabilities were identified and listed in the CVE during the 2001-2004 time period. For several of the vulnerabilities, we were unable to get information on the exact date of discovery of the vulnerability. Additionally, some of the vulnerabilities affected both open source as well as proprietary software, in which case, it was difficult to determine the date of discovery or the date when the vulnerability was fixed, for both. We removed such data points and ended up with a list of 454 vulnerabilities. This was dataset D1. A bootstrap procedure was performed, explained in the following section, to impute those missing values where we only needed to estimate the date of discovery of the vulnerability. There were 170 such data points. The resulting data set, D2, contains 624 vulnerabilities. Sources for the information on dates of vulnerability discovery and patch application typically included the CERIAS website (http://www.cerias.purdue.edu), ISS X-Force, Security Focus, CERT, Microsoft Security Bulletins, Bugtraq, KDE, Neohapsis, etc. The dates of discovery of the vulnerabilities are as reported by
these sources when the vendor is notified. For information on the dates of vendor response, we have taken them to be the dates when the security advisories were made public by the vendor, unless when the actual dates of vendor response were available.

Given the difficulty in obtaining such confidential details related to information security, and the resources available to us, getting exact dates of occurrence of these events was not an easy task. However, we have been consistent in this regard, during our entire data collection process and hence still believe that our preliminary findings would be validated. Next, we describe the procedure that was used to impute the missing data points.

**Estimating Missing values**

As mentioned earlier, a large number of vulnerabilities had missing values related to the date of discovery of the vulnerability. If these data points were deleted, our analysis would be possibly biased. In order to eliminate this bias, we estimated the missing values using a simple bootstrap procedure (Greene and Greene, 2002).

For simplicity, we initially built our full data set by drawing discovery dates randomly from our existing data set, with replacement. This inherently assumes that our full data set of patch times and inter-arrival times had a similar distribution to our existing data set. Then this random drawing was performed for 1000 iterations to obtain mean estimates. The overall patch times and inter-arrival times of vulnerabilities did not show much deviation from our original result. Our data sources contained information on the vulnerability type, the date it was patched and also when the CVE was assigned to these vulnerabilities.

Now, to impute the patch times and inter-arrival times, we incorporated the following constraints:

- We drew the values randomly from an exponential distribution where the mean was equal to the mean values obtained from our existing data set.
- An upper limit and lower limit for each value randomly drawn was determined as an additional constraint, from the information contained in our data sources.

We, therefore present the results from our preliminary analysis for the two datasets.

**Results and Discussion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Open Source Software</th>
<th>Proprietary Software</th>
<th>T-stat for difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean (days)</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>109.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>48.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>39.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>48.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>11.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>50.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. Mean Time to Patch for Dataset D1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Open Source Software</th>
<th>Proprietary Software</th>
<th>T-stat/p-value for difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean (days)</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57.76</td>
<td>57.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>30.64</td>
<td>41.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34.12</td>
<td>37.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>48.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>14.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>34.30</td>
<td>43.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Mean Time to Patch for Dataset D2**
Tables 1 and 2 show the mean times to patch for open-source and proprietary software, across different time periods. Goodness-of-fit tests were performed for the Normal, Lognormal, and Weibull distributions. Different parameter values of the Gamma distribution were tested and the exponential distribution was found to have the best fit. Note that we do not have adequate data points for years 2000 and 2004. Hence we can only make limited inferences here. However, if we look at years 2001-2003, we clearly see a smaller mean time to patch in the case of open-source systems. We compute the t-statistic to determine the statistical significance of the difference between the means in open-source and proprietary software (Greene and Greene, 2002). The last column in Table 1 shows the t-values for comparing the means. The results that are significant at 10% level for one-tailed p-values are indicated in bold. We see that Hypothesis 1 is supported only in some cases. We provide market share data (CNET, 2004) for both open source and proprietary operating system software in client applications, in Table 3, for comparison purposes. The data shown does not reflect any major trend reversals. Contrary to popular belief, proprietary operating system software market share only seems to grow larger. Do note that our dataset is restricted only to vulnerabilities in client applications (and not server applications).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Market Share for OSS (in percentage)</th>
<th>Market Share for PS (in percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (Estimates)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Market Share Data for Open Source and Proprietary OSS

Figure 1 illustrates the exponential distribution of the counts of the patch-times for the two software-types. The overall mean time to patch for open-source software was 34.30 days, clearly about 14% less than the mean times in proprietary software (38.90 days). Similarly, figures 3 and 4 illustrate the distribution of the inter-arrival times of vulnerabilities for open-source and proprietary software systems.
Figure 2. Fit of the Exponential Distribution for Patch Times

Figure 3. Inter-Arrival Times of Published Vulnerabilities
Figure 4. Fit of the Exponential Distribution for Inter-arrival Times of Vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of OS affected</th>
<th>Inter-arrival times of vulnerabilities (T-stat of Difference of means = -0.20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Mean Inter-arrival Times of Vulnerabilities

The numbers in Table 4 show the difference in the mean inter-arrival times of vulnerabilities for the two software-types. There is not much difference in the mean inter-arrival times and though proprietary software exhibits a lot more variation, the difference in the means is not statistically significant (t-value = 1.10) at the 10% level. Hence, at this point, we cannot conclude that open-source software exhibit greater robustness. We, therefore, reject Hypothesis 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability Characteristics</th>
<th>Vulnerability Classification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Open Source Software</th>
<th>Proprietary Software</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Vulnerability</td>
<td>Confidentiality</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Protection</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Type and Nature of Vulnerabilities

Table 5 shows a breakdown of the nature of the vulnerability by type and severity for open-source and proprietary operating system software. Figure 5 shows the moving averages for the patch times and the vulnerability inter-arrival times. Adequate
smoothening has been done, considering 120 event-intervals to show the trajectory of the two curves. Since the two parameters were found to be exponentially distributed, an exponential moving average was also computed and Figure 6 shows the relative convergence of the two curves for the patch times and inter-arrival times. As expected, the exponential moving averages yield a smoother convergence.

Figure 5. Simple Moving Average for patch-times and vulnerability inter-arrival times for 120-events interval.

Figure 6. Exponential Moving Average for patch-times and vulnerability inter-arrival times for 120-events interval.
Summarizing, the results provide some perspective into the ongoing debate of security between open source and proprietary software systems. The paper makes a contribution to this growing literature on software security in two ways. First, the analysis reveals yet again that the security issue is still open. Critics who argue in favor of the “more critical eyes” theory may do well to look at the observations again. Though time to patch or vendor-responsiveness, is not the only measure of software quality, in the minds of the user, it is definitely one of the proxies for software security. The faster the patch is available, the more confident users feel towards the software’s security. Again, research (Rescorla, 2002) does show that securing a system does not end with making a patch available. Most users are found to be less responsive (call it user-responsiveness) to apply the patch that is available to them. Yet, restricting our study to purely technical concerns, and to just the vulnerabilities found in operating system applications, the results are not conclusive.

As mentioned earlier, given the limited data available to us, we do not differentiate our data sources based on the different disclosure policies they follow. Incorporating them would ensure a more complete framework is in place. Going back to the argument of proprietary software being more vulnerable and hence less secure, our results show that this is not the case. Both kinds of software contain almost the same number of vulnerabilities and further, the yearly data reveals no trends indicating any one holding a clear advantage over the other, from a vulnerability standpoint. The issue of hackers and other criminal elements putting more effort into targeting proprietary software is still unaddressed by this research; however, as open source software gains market share, it too may become a more “interesting” target. This remains to be seen.

Conclusion and Future Research

Our study contributes to the literature on software security. The key motivation remains to carry the software reliability model forward. Quite a few data points had to be imputed, since the information was incomplete. Currently, we are examining the data by classifying it along the dimensions of type of vulnerability (confidentiality, availability, integrity and/or security protection), severity of the vulnerability (high or low) and their exploit range (remote or local). We seek to further examine this data through an analytical framework from the perspective of security as reliability. The insights available from the software reliability literature will be applied accordingly. Another issue worth pursuing is that of staffing questions for software development. Some critics state that open source software has too many developers than is efficient, and thus wastes resources. Others purport that perhaps open source software has naturally evolved to rely on the relatively large numbers of programmers used to manage the software. We hope to eventually shed light on this issue as well.

Our analysis serves as a good starting point to compare open source and proprietary software systems from a security perspective. However, the study is not complete. We hope to obtain similar data on server applications as well. Finally, incorporating the information on vendor disclosure policies for our different data sources and also the user patterns in applying a patch once it is available, will help us build on the framework we are trying to establish through this study. How good a patch is, or whether frequent patching is cost-effective are still questions open to research. An interesting extension of our analysis would be to analyze the quality of a patch, in terms of the number of new vulnerabilities it introduces into the system. Though data might be difficult to obtain, an analytical birth-and-death model could capture the mechanics of the vulnerability-patch lifecycle adequately.

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