Abstract
Not only are Databases an integral and critical part of many information systems, they are critical information assets to many business enterprises. However, the network and host intrusion detection systems most enterprises use to detect attacks against their information systems cannot detect transaction-level attacks against databases. Transaction-level attacks often come from authorized users in the form of inference, query flood, or other anomalous query attacks. Insider attacks are not only growing in frequency, but remain significantly more damaging to businesses than external attacks. This paper proposes a database intrusion detection model to detect and respond to transaction-level attacks from authorized database users.
Recommended Citation
Barton, Kevin, "Database Intrusion Detection: Defending Against the Insider Threat" (2012). AMCIS 2012 Proceedings. 10.
https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2012/proceedings/ISSecurity/10
Database Intrusion Detection: Defending Against the Insider Threat
Not only are Databases an integral and critical part of many information systems, they are critical information assets to many business enterprises. However, the network and host intrusion detection systems most enterprises use to detect attacks against their information systems cannot detect transaction-level attacks against databases. Transaction-level attacks often come from authorized users in the form of inference, query flood, or other anomalous query attacks. Insider attacks are not only growing in frequency, but remain significantly more damaging to businesses than external attacks. This paper proposes a database intrusion detection model to detect and respond to transaction-level attacks from authorized database users.